You Can Say That if You Want--The Redefinition of Hearsay in Rule 801 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence by Blakey, Walker J.
YOU CAN SAY THAT IF YOU WANT-THE REDEFINITION OF HEARSAY
IN RULE 801 OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
WA'. EPR J. BLAKEY*
"You can say that if you want..."
Charles C. Callahan
I remember my first classes at the Ohio State University College of
Law with a great deal of pleasure because I was fortunate enough to be
introduced to the study of law by five able teachers whose approaches to
law were so different that between them they opened up an amazing
number of ways of thinking about law. One of the courses with which
my law school education began was a property course taught by Charles
C. Callahan. Professor Callahan was a man of enormous mental force.
His usual teaching device was to lead the class through questions, sug-
gestions, and short lectures in a straightforvard analysis of the problems
presented by the law of property. Frequently this analysis cut through
or ignored the more complex and roundabout analysis we found in the
cases in the text. We quickly learned to approach those cases with at
least some of the critical spirit with which our instructor dealt with them
but we were nevertheless likely to bring up in class some elaborate
piece of doctrine which we had found in a case. I remember that Pro-
fessor Callahan had a characteristic way of responding to those efforts
which were likely to complicate rather than assist our discussions. He
would begin by saying "You can say that if you want" or "You can talk
that way if you want to" and then proceed to suggest what seemed to
him a more straightforward way of dealing with the question.
It therefore seems appropriate in an issue of this Journal devoted to
his memory to analyze the definition of hearsay contained in rule 801
of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and to suggest that the defi-
nition raises a number of problems which can be better dealt with if we
can clarify what we are doing when we say that certain categories of
evidence are or are not hearsay.
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence are now embodied in a bill
making its way through Congress.2 This bill was adopted by the House
of Representatives on February 6, 1974.' The proposed rules were orig-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1I wish to thank fellow Callahan students William G. Batchelder III, Alan L Briggs,
Susan I. Brown, and M. Andrew Ross for their assistance in reconstructing the methods and
the language of Professor Callahan's classes.
2 H. R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
3 120 CoNG. REC. H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
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inally drafted by a distinguished Advisory Committee to the Judicial
Conference of the United States4 with the expectation that they would
be promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States under the
rule-making authority given to the Supreme Court under the Rules of
Court Act." The proposed rules were in fact so promulgated by the
Supreme Court on November 20, 1972,0 and transmitted to Congress by
the Chief Justice on February 5, 1973.' A combination of doubts as to
whether the Supreme Court actually had authority to promulgate evi-
dence rules" and opposition to particular rules0 led Congress to pass
legislation preventing the rules from going into effect. 10 A subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee chaired by Congressman William L.
Hungate undertook to rewrite the rules as legislation to be adopted by
the Congress." Hearings were held,1 2 a Committee Print with substan-
tial changes was circulated,'3 and a bill with further changes was reported
out' 4 and passed by the House15 with a few more changes.'"
One section of rule 801 was amended when the Committee Print
was prepared," and again in the reported bill,18 but the structure of the
rule remains the same as in the version approved by the Supreme Court.1"
It well may be that the complexity of the rule resisted further analysis
and amendment. The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence are the
fourth attempt in recent years to improve the law of evidence by creat-
ing an evidence code. This federal code has incorporated or adopted
ideas about hearsay developed in the 1942 Model Code of Evidence of
the American Law Institute, the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence of the
4 See Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 Guo,
L. J. 125 n.3 (1974).
528 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
0 56 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1972).
7 Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciaty, 93d Cong., 1st Sess,, Ser, 2, at
1 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Hungate), [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
8 119 CONG. REc. H1722-1727 (daily ed. March 14, 1973).
0 119 CONG. REc. H1721-1727 (daily ed. March 14, 1973).
10 Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Star. 9 (Mar. 30, 1973).
11H. R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1973); 1973 Hearings, sttfta note 7.
12 Id.
13 Proposed Changes to the Rules of Evidence Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, House Comm,
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973). The Committee Print is reproduced in 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, Supplement at 145-184.
14 H. R. REP. No. 650,supra note 11, at 1.
'5 120 CoNG. REc. H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
16 120 CONG. REC. H543-H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
1" See text accompanying note 120 infra.
18 See text accompanying note 121 infra.
19 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1972).
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the
1965 California Evidence Code.2 1
The definition of hearsay contained in rule 801 is complex. Persons
who are already somewhat acquainted with the idea of hearsay and the
common exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as lawyers, judges, and law
professors, are likely to find that the rule can most easily be read by
dividing it into three apparently unrelated parts: subdivisions (a), (b),
and (c), subdivision (d) (1), and subdivision (d) (2). Persons who
do attempt to relate the three parts, such as students who want to find
out what hearsay is, are likely to become confused and frustrated. There
are several theories and compromises between theories that explain the
complex definition of hearsay in rule 801,21 but before we consider them
and attempt to evaluate their worth we need to do what Professor Cal-
lahan so frequently did-clear some ground upon which to base our
analysis.
Let us begin by looking at five facts about the concept of hearsay on
which there is general agreement. The first fact is that despite disagree-
ments as to the outer limits of the concept, everyone would agree that the
concept of hearsay includes at least all situations in which a party to a
trial attempts to prove during the trial how an event occurred by offer-
ing as evidence a statement made outside the trial which describes how
the event occurred" and the person who made the statement is not pres-
2 0 Rule 801 (a), (b), and (c) follows MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 501 (1) and (2)
(hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE), UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENE 62(1), 63 (hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM RULES), and CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 225, 1200 (West 1966) (hereinafter
cited as CAL EVID. CODE). Rule 801(d) (1) follows CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1235, 1236, 1238.
21 See text accompanying notes 62-64, 89-98, 103-12.
22 The most common definition of hearsay is the one set forth in 29 Am. JuR. 2d. Evidence
§ 493 (1967). Hearsay is defined there as "evidence which derives its value, not solely from
the credit to be given to the witness upon the stand, but in part from the veracity and compe-
tency of some o:her person." This writer believes that this is an excellent and practical defi-
nition but that it fails to deal with several refinements supported by many scholars and re-
formers. The text sets forth a description of the minimum that is dearly hearsay regardless
of our decisions on the refinements.
The draftsmen of the Model Code, the Uniform Rules, the California Evidence Code, and
proposed rule 801 restrict hearsay to situations in which an out-of-court statement is offered
into evidence to prove the truth of a matter asserted in the statement, MODEL CODE rule
501(1), 501(2); UNIFORM RULE 62(1), 63; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 225, 1200; Proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a), (b), and (c), 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1972) (hereinafter
cited as Proposed Rule). This restriction on the definition of hearsay will permit the admis-
sion of evidence of nonassertive conduct and implied assertions by out-of-court persons.
Such evidence does derive its value in part from the veracity and competency of the out-of-
court persons but the advocates of the admission of nonassertive conduct and implied as-
sertions argue that this evidence is more trustworthy than ordinary hearsay. McCormick,
The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L J. 489 (1930); Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule
as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 RocKy MT. L. REv. 133 (1961). But see
Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
14 STAN. L. R. 682 (1962) and Falknor, Silcnce as Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L REv. 192 (1940).
The minimal description describes an assertion offered to prove the truth of its own contents
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ent at the trial." There are many, including this writer, who would
argue that the concept is much broader in several ways than this mini-
mal description but everyone will accept at least this minimal descrip-
tion24 and that is enough for our present purposes.
The second fact on which there would be general agreement is that
the danger involved in this situation is that the finder of fact in the court
will have difficulty adequately evaluating the worth of the statement
made out of court.25
This agreed danger may require some further explanation since each
of us manages everyday to evaluate adequately a great deal of what is
clearly hearsay. 6 Almost all of what we know in this world comes to
us in the form of hearsay. If we were to refuse to consider what we
think we know because of what we have been told by our parents, our
friends, our teachers, our textbooks, and our newspapers, there would be
very little left that we could say we do know. What we do with hearsay
in everyday life 'explains, however, why it is a courtroom problem and
why it is a courtroom problem we have never been able to satisfactorily
resolve. In everyday life we evaluate hearsay on the basis of everything
we already know. We consider the source, whether the story sounds
likely, and how the story fits with everything else we know. In consid-
ering an ordinary piece of hearsay we are likely to give some slight at-
tention to dozens of facts. In dealing with all the items of hearsay that
which would be hearsay even if the definition of hearsay were to be restricted to permit the
admission of nonassertive conduct and implied assertions.,
23 The minimal description also states (in order to avoid conflict with another proposed re-
form) that the person who made the out-of-court statement is not present. Wigmore and
Maguire both argue that an out-of-court statement should not be considered hearsay If the
out-of-court declarant is present at the trial to be cross-examined. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the
Thicket, 14 VAN. L. REV. 741, 767-68 (1961). There is little authority, however, for
such a restriction on the definition of hearsay. MODEL CODE rule 503 (b) and UNIvORM
RuLE 63 (1) both create an exception based on the availability of the out-of-court declar-
ant for a in-court cross-examination which would have the same result, 'and the California
Evidence Code provides that three narrow classes of evidence are admissible in those circum-
stances. Proposed rule 801 provides that three classes of evidence are "not hearsay" in those
circumstances.
24 The minimal description of hearsay in the text would need one further refinement In
order not to conflict with proposed rule 801. The minimal rule should also say "the statement
is not an admission by a party-opponent." It seems wiser, however, to ignore this confusing
and unprofitable small problem for as long as possible. See text accompanying notes 90 to
98 infra.
2s5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCH
§ 245 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; E. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 248 (1962); Strahorn, A Reconrideration of the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. Rrv. 484, 486 (1937); Maguire, supra note 23, at 747-48; Faiknor,
The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule, supra note 22, at 136; Falknor, Silence, jupra note
22, at 194. Finman, supra note 22, at 684.20 FALKNOR, Hearsay, 1969 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 591, 591-92.
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we are treating as true at any one moment we are likely to have used
thousands of facts.
When we are called into court to act as fact-finders, however, a great
deal of care is usually taken to ensure that we are judging a strange dis-
pute between strangers. This greatly reduces (although it does not by
any means end) the usefulness of judging the evidence presented by
comparing it to what we already know.
We have developed strong devices to enable judges and jurors to
evaluate the worth of testimony offered in court but they are not very
useful for evaluating out-of-court statements.27  The strongest of these
devices for evaluating in-court testimony is usually cross-examination -s
and it can hardly be applied at all when an out-of-court statement is
repeated by a witness who does not even claim any personal knowledge
of the facts he is repeating. It is therefore usually said that the defect in
hearsay is that it has not been subjected to cross-examination. " Wig-
more has demonstrated that lack of cross-examination is a fatal defect
which will prevent admission even of out-of-court statements which have
been taken under oath and reduced to writing.80 In the normal court-
room situation, however, the right to cross-examination is accompanied
by the right to other courtroom procedures. The witness is placed un-
der oath and he is required to make his statement during direct examina-
tion. These may also be very valuable rights for the party against whom
the statement is offered." We will be coming back to this point be-
cause the definition of hearsay in rule 801 defines certain out-of-court
statements as "not hearsay" on the basis of the existence of an oppor-
tunity for in-court cross-examination without any direct examination. 2
The third generally agreed fact is that extremely large numbers of
items of hearsay testimony are admitted into evidence under numerous
exceptions to the hearsay rule, which create categories of evidence which
are admitted despite the hearsay rule.38 These categories are not based
upon satisfaction of the kind of elaborate analysis of the possible worth
of a particular piece of hearsay which we make outside of court. Instead
each category permits the introduction of all of a certain kind of evi-
dence that falls within the definition of each category. The categories
developed historically and there is much about them that is simply acd-
27 Strahorn, supra note 25, at 484-86.
285 J. WIGMORE, EVIDEN cE §§ 1362, 1367 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRMICK § 245.
29 Id., Maguire, supra note 2 1A, at 748.
30 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
81 Strahorn, supra note 25, at 485.
32 Proposed Rule 801(d) (1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1972).
33 5 & 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-1764 (3d ed. 1940); McCoR IicK §§ 254-324.
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dent.34  In only two cases-that of depositions and of testimony at pre-
vious trials3 -- do the categories deal with evidence that satisfies the re-
quirement of an opportunity for cross-examination. Instead the justifi-
cations for the creation of the categories have been either a feeling of
unusual need for a certain type of evidence80 (such as a dying declaration
by the victim in a murder case) 37 or a hope that certain kinds of state-
ments were more likely to be true38 (regular business records8" or state-
ments against one's own financial interest at the time they were made),t°
The existence of these numerous exceptions raises the question
whether the definition of hearsay is really very important. The definition
is important because the exceptions, although numerous, are limited and
will continue to be limited. Even if some bold new category of excep,
tion were to be created-such as the Massachusetts rule permitting the
admission of any statement made by a deceased person in good faith
and upon personal knowledge4 1-we would still be concerned with the
definition of hearsay for all cases that did not fall into such a category.
But the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence do not create any new
categories. They do continue the good work of recent years that has
done much "to rationalize the rules and to improve their practical work-
ability, more along evolutionary lines than revolutionary. ' 4 2  The bill
passed by the House of Representatives removed the only change in the
exceptions included in the Supreme Court version of the Rules which
appeared to be of major importance. The exceptions to the hearsay rule
are stated in rules 803 and 804 of the proposed rules.43 In the version
of the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court both of these rules
ended with the following final exceptions:
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the fore-
going exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.44
These exceptions-803 (24) and 804 (b) (6)-have been called the
"catch-all" exceptions and they excited many attacks from those who
34 Morgan, supra note 25, at 253; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1423 (3d ed. 1940).
35 McCoIuMcK § 254.
365 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1421 (3d ed. 1940).
37id. § 1431.
8Id. § 1422.
39 McCoRMIcK § 306.
405 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1457 (3d ed. 1940).
41 McCoRMIcK § 326 at 752; 5 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1576 at 440.441 (3d ed. 1940).
42 McCoRMICK § 325 at 752.
43 56 F.R.D. 183 at 300-328 (1972).
44 Proposed Rule 803 (24), 56 F.R.D. 183, 303 (1972) and Proposed Rule 804 (b) (6),
Id,. at 322.
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:eared they might be used liberally and create enormous uncertainty
Ls to what was admissible.45  The House subcommittee removed these
'catch-all" exceptions in both its print" and its reported bill,4T and the
)ill passed by the House does not include them.48 The effect of this is to
:ake away from the federal courts their existing but seldom exercised
)owers to create new exceptions to the hearsay rule49 and to freeze the
xceptions into their present shape.50
It may be that Congress and the critics of the "catch-all" exceptions
:eared that "a power appearing in a codification is more likely to be lib-
:rally used than one implicit in antiquity.""' And the standard for ad-
nission under the "catch-all" exceptions which requires only that state-
nents have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" comparable to
hose of the existing exceptions -52 would not reassure anyone who was
vorried by these sections. The other exceptions are too varied to give
my clear meaning to such a standard. The defeat of the "catch-all" ex-
:eptions may also be explained, however, as the product of a general
iostility to admitted hearsay which the provisions of rule 801 largely
,but not entirely) avoided by never admitting that they were (or might
)e) hearsay.
The fourth and fifth generally agreed facts about hearsay which we
ieed to point out before looking at proposed rule 801 are complimen-
ary: hearsay includes physical acts as well as words but it does not in-
:lude all words spoken out of court. Hearsay clearly includes acts which
ire used as substitutes for speech such as the act of a person who nods
is head "yes" in response to a question or the act of a person who
)oints her finger at one suspect in a lineup.5' Whether hearsay also in-
:ludes acts that were not intended as speech but which may enable us to
uess the thoughts and beliefs of the actors is a harder question and one
which proposed rule 801 attempts to settle by excluding such acts from
ts definition of hearsay.54
451973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 202, 216, 252, 264 and 499, Supplement at 68, 91,
!82, 290, 291, 305, 308, 387 and 389.
46 Supra note 13.
4 7 Supra note 11.
4 8 Supra note 15.
49 Rothstein, supra note 4, at 156 and n. 162.
5 0 Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HAV.V. I REV. 957, 973-74 (1974). The California
.vidence Code does leave open the possibility that additional exceptions may be created by
he courts. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1200(b), 160 and last paragraph of comment to §
200.
5 1 Rothstein, supra note 4, at 156.
52 Supra note 44.
53 MCCOpN UCK § 250 at 596.
54 Supra note 19.
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Conversely, just as out-of-court acts that are used to make assertions
are hearsay, out-of-court statements that are offered in evidence for some
purpose other than to prove assertions contained in them are not hear-
say.' The familiar formula used to offer such evidence goes: "We are
not offering this statement to prove the truth of its contents but merely
to prove that it was made." Of course such an out-of-court statement
can be used in this way only if there is a nontestimonial purpose for
which it is relevant, but there are a great many situations in which the
mere fact that a statement was made is relevant. Thus, in a lawsuit
based on an oral contract, we need to prove that the parties said the
words that formed the oral contract,", and in a slander lawsuit we need
to prove that slanderous words were spoken.57
Matters get a little more difficult when we deal with out-of-court
statements that could be offered for either a testimonial use or a non-
testimonial use. An example of this would be an out-of-court warning
to a driver: "The brakes aren't working on this car." If offered to prove
that the brakes were bad it would be hearsay, but if it were offered only
for the purpose of proving that the driver was warned it would be non-
hearsay.58 We will let such a statement come in for the nonhearsay use
only and instruct the jury that they are not to consider the hearsay asser-
tion contained in it.59
There is considerable disagreement as to whether such limiting instruc-
tions keep the jury from actually considering the hearsay assertion, but
the jury will not be able to disobey their instructions and apply the hear.
say assertion as evidence of the fact asserted unless there is additional
evidence of that fact in the case. The limited admission at least keeps
the party offering the hearsay statement for some other purpose from
making his or her case with the hearsay statement and unless that party
introduces some other evidence of the fact asserted by the hearsay a ver-
dict will be directed against him or her.
Does hearsay include the situation in which a party offers to prove
that an out-of-court statement was made merely in order to support an
inference that the declarant must have believed or felt some fact that is
relevant? Since a direct statement of the fact by the out-of-court de-
darant would seem clearly to be hearsay, these statements of belief or
feeling at least come very close to hearsay.
We have dealt with this problem of whether out-of-court statements
65 McCoRMICK § 249; 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENC § 1770 (3d ed. 1940).
50 6 J. WIGMORE, EVD.ENCE § 1770 (3d ed. 1940).
57 Id. at 189.
68 McConucK § 249 at 591.
69 Id. § 59.
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Lsed as circumstantial evidence are hearsay in two different ways. When
he belief or feeling sought to be proven concerned the state of mind of
he out-of-court declarant, we have created an exception for declarations
£ a present state of mind or feelings. 60 In cases in which the declarant's
rate of mind was relevant, we could not hope for any better evidence
ban the declarations and actions of the person involved and the need for
ae exception was clear regardless of whether we called those dedara-
ion hearsay or not."' This exception appears in the proposed Federal
.ules of Evidence in rule 803 (3).
Attempts to use out-of-court statements which show circumstantially
ae speaker's beliefs about facts other than his own state of mind pre-
ent a different problem. The only decided case in which the problem
received any adequate discussion,"0 2 Wright v. Doe d. Tatham," ex-
luded statements offered as circumstantial evidence of the declarant's
eliefs about another person as hearsay, but a great many writers have
.rged that such evidence be admitted by excluding it from the definition
f hearsay.' This type of evidence is frequently called an implied as-
crtion, although the problem is essentially the same as that of evidence
f nonassertive conduct and that title is sometimes applied to both state-
ients and nonverbal conduct offered as circumstantial evidence of beliefs.
'roposed rule 801 excludes both nonverbal conduct that is not intended
s an assertion and statements used to prove an implied assertion.
We are now ready to consider proposed rule 801. It reads:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement.-A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an as-
sertion.
(b) Declarant.-A "'dedarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay.-"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by
the dedarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay
if-
(1) Prior statement by witness.-The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the°
statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony
and was given under oath subject to cross-examination, and subject to
60 6 J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 1714 (3d ed. 1940).
61 McCoRaIcK § 249 at 590-591.
62 McCormick, The Borderland, supra note 22, at 492.
03 5 C1. & Fin. 670 (H.L. 1838); 7 A & E 313 (Ex. 1837).
64 McCormick, The Borderland, supra note 22; Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Ruie as a "See.
lo" Rule, supra note 22; Falknor, Hearsay, supra note 26; Morgan, Hearsay, 25 liss. L J. 1,
8 (1953).
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the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition, or (B)
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or im-
plied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive, or (C) one of identification of a. person made after per-
ceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent.-The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual
or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a per-
son authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of
the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.05
This rule can be most conveniently read by breaking it into three
rules. Subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) restate the definition of hearsay
used in the Model Code, the Uniform Rules, and the California Evidence
Code. Subdivision (d) (2) restates with some improvements conven-
tional doctrine concerning the admissibility of admissions of a party-op-
ponent. Its most surprising feature is that it describes admissions of a
party-opponent as "not hearsay." Although some scholars have argued
for such a description of admissions of a party-opponent,00 such admis-
sions have usually been described as an exception to the hearsay rule.01
Subdivision (d) (1) follows the California Evidence Code' s in describing
three very limited categories of evidence as "not hearsay" if the out-of-
court declarant is present in court to be cross-examined.
SUBDIVISIONS (a) (b) AND (c)
Since subdivisions (a), (b), and (r) merely restate a conventional
definition of hearsay,'' the only prob, ems created by these subsections
involve the continuing issue of nonassertive conduct and implied asser-
tions. There are two questions we need to ask with respect to implied
assertions and nonassertive conduct. The first question is how well does
the definition exempt this kind of evidence from the ban of the hearsay
rule. The second question is whether this kind of evidence should be
exempted from the hearsay ban.
In the definition a "statement," and therefore a hearsay statement in-
65 120 CONG. REc. H558, H559 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
66 See MODEL CODE rule 501, UNIFORM RULEs 62, 63, and CAL, EVID. CO1u §§ 225,
1200. See text accompanying notes 91 and 92 infra.
67 See text accompanying note 89 infra, and McCoRMIcK § 262 at 628-29.
68 See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1235, 1236, 1238.
0 See note 66, sera, and Falknor, Hearsay, supra note 26 at 59-1.95.
[Vol. 35
HEARSAY
cludes "nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an as-
sertion." The definition thereby excludes from hearsay nonverbal con-
duct of a person if it is not intended by him as an assertion. The diffi-
culty with this is that it does not tell us how to decide if an out-of-court
declarant meant to make an assertion or not.70 It is not likely that we
would know very much about the motives of the out-of-court declarant
in any situation in which we would resort to this kind of evidence. (This
is a point to which we will be coming back when we discuss whether
this kind of evidence should be exempted from the hearsay ban.) The
Advisory Committee suggests in its comment that the rule will work be-
cause the burden of proof will be on any party who claims that conduct
should be excluded as hearsay to show that it was intended as an as-
sertion. 1 That would appear to mean, however, that conduct will be
allowed into evidence because it cannot be shown to have been intended
as an assertion and not that the conduct which is allowed into evidence
will in fact be conduct that was not intended as an assertion.
The definition includes in hearsay only statements "offered 'in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and the Advisory Com-
mittee note tells us that this will exclude from hearsay statements which
are offered in evidence to prove an inference as to the declarant's be-
liefs which can be made from the fact that the declarant made the state-
ment .72 It would appear to this writer that the words of the rule them-
selves actually leave some room for an argument that in those situations
in which the proponent of an implied inference offers a statement which
must be found to be a true assertion before any inference can logically
be drawn from it, such a statement falls within this definition of hearsay.
However, the interpretation to which the Advisory Committee adds its
authority is one that has been consistently given for this definition of
hearsay," and I would expect that interpretation to be used by the federal
courts.
The remaining question is whether nonassertive conduct and implied
assertions should be exempted from the hearsay ban. The actual ques-
tion is whether our interpretation of what an out-of-court witness be-
lieves about a fact we want to know but which he does not tell us is
more trustworthy than an out-of-court statement of that fact by that wit-
ness.
T0 See Finman, supra note 22, at 695-96.
71Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 801(a), 56 F.R.D. 183,
293-94 (1972).
721d.
7 6 J. WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 1790 (3d ed. 1940); McCORMIcK § 250; Comment (b.)
to MODEL CODE ruile 501; Comment to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200. But see, McCOnItcK § 246
at 586.
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There are two arguments to support the contention that what the wit-
ness did not say is more trustworthy. The first of these applies only to
evidence of conduct. This is the argument that a person who acts upon
a belief shows a great deal more confidence in that belief than a person
who merely states the belief.74 This is not in fact true of all actions for
many will involve little or no reliance on a belief,75 but even when ac-
tions involve substantial reliance we must weigh this against our uncer-
tainty as to just what unspoken belief the actor is relying upon. Let us
consider the actual case in Wright v. Doe d. Tatham.7 0 The question in
that case was whether the testator had been competent to make a will.
The defendant offered several letters written to the testator. One was
from the Vicar of the parish asking the testator to have his attorney meet
with an attorney for the parish. The argument is that the Vicar must
have believed the testator to be competent or he would not have written
such a letter, but this is only the possibility that suited the party offering
the letter. Two other reasonable possibilitiet are (1) that the Vicar
considered the testator incompetent but since the testator went on man-
aging his affairs the Vicar had to try to deal with him as politely as he
could, or (2) that the incompetent testator's affairs were being quietly
managed by the attorney whose action the letter requested and although
the letter was in form addressed to the testator the Vicar did not expect
him to read it. If we acknowledge those possibilities we will see that
the Vicar's reliance upon his belief tells us less than we thought, for un-
til we know what he really believed we cannot know in what way he
was relying upon.that belief.
The second argument commonly advanced to support the contention
that nonassertive conduct and implied assertions are more trustworthy
than direct statements from the same person is based upon an elaborate
analysis of hearsay dangers.
The analytical tools which we have available to evaluate hearsay, pos-
sible hearsay, and potential exceptions are inadequate. The analysis of
hearsay dangers actually heard in courtrooms (when any is heard) fre-
quently consists of nothing more than two conflicting characterizations of
the evidence. The out-of-court statement may either be described as a
valuable piece of evidence which in-court examination would not have
74 Comment to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200; Falknor, The "Hear.Say" Rule as a "See.Do"
Rule, supra note 22, at 136-37.
75 Finman, supra note 22 at 691-93; Falknor, The "Hea.Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule,
supra note 22, text accompanying n.14.
76 Supra note 63.
77 Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule, sapra note 22; Morgan, Hearsay,
supra note 64; Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 801(a), 56 F.R.D. 183 at 293-94 (1972),
also set forth in part in text accompanying note 80 infra.
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affected or as a doubtful story that might well have been destroyed by
the in-court examination to which it was not exposed. Either character-
ization can be applied to any out-of-court statement since the test is en-
tirely hypothetical. Of course that means that all hearsay evidence should
be characterized as something in between good and worthless, but we
do not know what to do with such a characterization. The evidence either
comes in or it does not, and the fact-finders either believe it or they do
not.
American scholars have attempted to create a system to assist in the
evaluation of hearsay and hearsay exceptions by identifying four areas of
danger which would go untested by in-court examination if ordinary
hearsay were admitted.78 These areas of danger are narration, sincerity,
memory, and perception. Professor Finman described these methods of
analyzing dangers as follows:
When a fact finder relies on an express assertion, he must make four
assumptions, any one of which, if erroneous, will lead to an invalid con-
clusion: (1) Narration-it must be assumed that the fact finder's under-
standing of the speaker's words is the one the speaker intended to con-
vey. (2) Perception-it must be assumed that the speakc . accurately
perceived the matter reported in his statement. (3) Memrory-it must ba
assumed that the speaker accurately remembered his past peiccpion.
(4) Sincerity-it must be assumed that the speaker is attempting to tell
the truth. When the speaker is present in court, all these sources of po-
tential error can be probed through cross-examination. If, however, the
assertion is conveyed to the fact finder by W, who testiht-s that "X
said that f (the fact to be proved) is true," X cannot be cross-examined
on whether, when he made his statement, he was using language in the
usual manner, whether he accurately observed f and correctly remem-
bered his observation, and whether he was attempting to tell the truth
about f.79
This system of analysis is also inadequate, however. It can be used
to illustrate problems but not to find solutions to them. Each of these
areas of danger actually includes dozens of possible factors but the sys-
tem of analysis may easily lead the user to treat each area of danger as a
single problem or to give equal weight to each area of danger.
The Advisory Committee used this four-areas-of-danger analysis in
justifying the exclusion of nonassertive conduct and implied assertions
from the definition of hearsay in proposed rule 801. The Advisory Com-
mittee stated:
Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with respcct to the
perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor,
78 Finman, supra note 22, at n.12.
79 Id. at 684-85.
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but the Advisory Committee is of the view that: these dangers are mini-
mal in the absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of
the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class of evidence is free of the
possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than
with assertive verbal conduct. The situations giving-rise to the non-
verbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity.
Motivation, the nature of the conduct, and the presence or absence of
reliance will bear heavily upon the weight to be given the evidence,
Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct,
33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 133 (1961). Similar considerations govern non-
assertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is assertive but offered
as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted, also
excluded from the definition of hearsay by the language of subdivision
(c).°
Even if it were true that we could virtually "eliminate questions of
sincerity" with respect to these kinds of evidence we would not know
whether that increased the trustworthiness of these kinds of evidence un-
less we could determine whether questions of sincerity were a major part
of the dangers involved with this evidence.
The four-areas-of-danger analysis tends to suggest that questions of
sincerity are 25% of the dangers. It may be that the question of how
many dangers are involved in the use of a particular piece of evidence is
too complex for us to answer. Professor Finman suggests, however, that
questions of sincerity are not a major part of the dangers with which
we should be concerned. Finman suggests we should be looking at the
dangers which cross-examination might eliminate s8 and cites Morgan's
statement that courtroom experience shows that the principal utility of
cross-examination in the vast majority of lawsuits "will be in limiting or
eliminating the danger of deception through faults in memory and per
ception."8 o2
Furthermore it does not appear that nonassertive acts and implied
assertions are free from questions of sincerity. It has frequently been
argued that the danger of insincerity disappears when a person is not at-
tempting to make an assertion because he cannot intend to lie about an
assertion he does not intend to make.83 The problem with this analysis
80 56 F.R.D. 183, 294 (1972).
81 Finman, supra note 22, at 690.
8 2 Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HAIRM L
REv. 178, 188 (1948), quoted in Finman, supra note 22, at 691.
8 3 E.g., Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule, supra note 22, states at 136:
On this assumption, it is clear that evidence of conduct must be taken as freed
from at least one of the hearsay dangers, i.e., mendacity. A man does not lie to him.
self. Put otherwise, if in doing what he does a man has no intention of asserting the
existence or non-existence of a fact, it would appear that the trustworthiness of
evidence of this conduct is the same whether he is an egregious liar or a paragon of
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is that it assumes that there is only one lie which this person can desire
to tell. Actually there are a great many lies or half-truths which this
person might desire to tell which would affect the conduct we are trying
to interpret. Consider again the problem of the Vicar of the parish in
Wright v. Doe d. Tatham. I have suggested two explanations for the
Vicar's letter in addition to the one suggested by the defendant who at-
tempted to introduce the Vicar's letter. If either of these explanations
were true the Vicar would have had excellent honorable reasons to make
statements on which we cannot rely even though he had no intention to
make any statement, true or false, about the testator's competency. If
the Vicar were compelled to deal with a person he thought incompetent
but who still purported to run his own affairs the Vicar would have to
avoid insulting the testator by not giving any indication of his real opin-
ion. On the other hand, if the Vicar were really dealing with the attor-
ney who was to take the action and knew that the attorney felt it neces-
sary to maintain a fiction that the testator himself was controlling the
matter, the Vicar would have had reason to write his letter in whatever
form the attorney indicated was necessary.
We could, but will not, go on multiplying examples of situations in
which the Vicar might not tell the truth, but there is one more situation
that must be pointed out: the Vicar could write a letter falsely treating
the testator as competent because he wanted to create false evidence that
the testator was competent. Advocates of nonhearsay treatment of non-
assertive acts and implied assertions concede that this can happen but do
not tell us how to recognize it.84 Under the proposed rule 801 doubtful
nonassertive acts will be treated as nonassertive acts and be admitted into
evidence."
This brings us back again to the major reason nonassertive acts and
implied assertions should not be given nonhearsay treatment: we cannot
know either the reasons for nonassertive conduct or what assertions were
actually implied by a person who made a statement with sufficient cer-
tainty to justify the use of this class of evidence in a court of law. It
does not appear that there is actually any greater trustworthiness in this
class of evidence either with respect to sincerity or with respect to the
dangers which cross-examination might eliminate, but if there were, it
would be overcome by the ambiguity of this class of evidence.
veracity. Accordingly, the lack of opportunity for cross-examination in relation to
his veracity or lack of it, would seem to be of no substantial importance.
84 Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule, supra note 22, at n.13; Maguire,
rupra note 23, at 165-66; McCoRMICK § 250, text accompanying nn. 47-48; Advisory Com-
mittee's Note, supra note 71.
8
, See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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A recent California case applying the California Evidence Code pro-
visions treating nonassertive conduct as nonhearsay demonstrates this
problem. In People v. Clark,8 the State was permitted to prove that the
defendant's wife fainted when the defendant was asked if he owned a coat
with a fur-lined collar and turned to his wife and stated "I don't have
one like that, do I dear? 8 7  The most that can be said for this case is
that it is to be hoped the jury realized how irrelevant this was. But the
vice of such ambiguous evidence is that it is very easy to suggest an ex-
tremely relevant interpretation and in the context of a trial it is very easy
for us to think we know what interpretation is the correct one. 8
The problems of nonassertive acts and implied assertions have ap-
peared in more articles than cases. Perhaps this may be because the law-
yers who tried the cases in which these problems might have appeared did
not recognize the hearsay problems. But Clark demonstrates that these
are real problems that need real solutions. It would appear on the basis
of the preceding analysis that the proper solution would be to treat non-
assertive acts and implied assertions as hearsay and exclude them.
SUBDI ISIoN (d) (2)
The most interesting feature of subdivision 801(d) (2) is the provi-
sion that an admission by a party-opponent as defined in 801 (d) (2) is'
"not hearsay." This is surprising but it will apparently have only one
small effect on what actually happens in the courtroom, as will be shown
later.
Admissions by a party-opponent have usually been described as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. The Model Code, the Uniform Rules, and
the California Evidence Code all describe them as an exception. " They
will be equally admissible under either description, however, and the
party who offers admissions as evidence will not lose anything by the
change of description.
The Advisory Committee explains this portion of its hearsay defini-
tion by pointing out that admissions by a party-opponent are admitted
in evidence as an aspect of the adversary system rather than on the basis
80 6 Cal. App. 3d 658, 86 Cal. Rptr. 106 (5th Dist. Ct. App., 1970).
87 Id. at 668, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
88 Of course there will be some factual situations in which a convincing interpretation will
be possible such as the eases in which police officers who raided betting establishments answered
the telephones and talked to persons who tried to place bets, e.g., People v. Carella, 191 Cal.
App. 2d 115, 12 Cal. Rptr. 446 (4th Dist. Ct. App., 1961). But the question is not whether
some of this evidence would be worthwhile but rather does the entire category contain evl
dence that is more valuable than ordinary hearsay.
S9MODEL CODE rule 506, UNIFORM RULES 63(7), 63(8), and CAL, EvID. CODE §§
1220, 1221, 1222.
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of any guarantee of trustworthiness. The Advisory Committee suggests
that this makes admissions by a party-opponent very different from the
other exceptions.90 This theory is supported by arguments by Strahorn"l
and Wigmor -° that the other exceptions can be placed on a sounder log-
ical basis if admissions by a party-opponent are recognized as being some-
thing different with an entirely different justification. The theory that
admissions by a party-opponent are admitted because of the adversary sys-
tem is certainly supported by overwhelming historical evidence,"3 and
there are features of our present day rules concerning admissions that can
be-explained on no other basis.94 Thus the lack of any requirement of
personal knowledge for an admission would not make sense if we were
seeking assurances of trustworthiness, but it does make sense if it is enough
that one's adversary has somehow become responsible for a statement
that is embarassing to him. Despite the fact that the adversary theory
is adequate to explain the admissibility of admissions of a party-oppon-
ent, there are frequently present in particular admissions facts that do
give assurances of their trustworthiness because they do involve state-
ments that were against the obvious interests of the persons who made
them. We have not reorganized our theories about admissions of a party-
opponent to require these facts that do give assurances of trustworthiness,
but their presence probably explains the frequency and success with
which admissions of a party-opponent are used as evidence in courts.
Mere embarassing circumstances would not be so convincing.
The developing law of admissions with respect to whether an ad-
mission by an employee concerning his employment is evidence against
his employer can better be explained on a trustworthiness theory than on
a theory that the employer was actually responsible for the admission.
The employer who hires a truck driver to drive for him is clearly respon-
sible if the truck driver negligently injured someone while in the scope of
his employment. But all that the employer has hired the truck driver to
do is to drive and on a traditional agency theory the employer is not re-
sponsible for what the driver says. He hired him to drive and not to
talk. Therefore the driver's admissions could not be used in an action
against the employer. But the driver's admissions concerning his own
90 Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(2), 56 F.R.D.
183, 297 (972).
91 Supra note 25, at 488-90, 493; Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and
Admissions, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 564, 569-88 (1937).
92 4. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 1048 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
93 Id., §§ 1048, 1053; but see MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO.
AMmuCAN SYSTEM OF ITIGATION 146-148 (1956).
944 J. WIGMORE, EIDENCE § 1053 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); MCCORMICK §§ 263 and
264.
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work are likely to be reliable"5 and there has been a trend towards allow-
ing such statements to come in as admissions in actions against the em-
ployer.9" The Advisory Committee recognized that the employee's state-
ments were "valuable and helpful evidence"0 7 and wisely wrote two rules
-801(d) (2) (C) and 801(d) (2) (D). 801(d) (2) (C) sets forth a
rule for statements actually authorized and 801(d) (2) (D) defines "a
statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope
of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relation-
ship" as an admission which may be offered against the employer with-
out any showing that the employee was given authority to talk.
Regardless of the reasons why admissions of a party-opponent come
in, the way in which we use them when they come in-as testimonial
evidence of their contents-makes it hard to think of them as something
other than hearsay. As Professor Morgan states:
Whether an admission is an exception to the hearsay rule depends
upon one's definition of hearsay. If we define hearsay as an extra-
judicial statement offered as tending to prove the truth of the matter
stated, an admission clearly falls within it, and most commentators so
regard it.08
It is hard t6 think of a way to define hearsay so as to exclude admis-
sions-except to say "But this does not include admissions of a party-
opponent" which is the way in which proposed rule 801 (d) (2) does ex-
clude them.
The one consequence that does flow from the fact that admissions
by a party-opponent are defined as not hearsay is that parties against
whom admissions are offered will not be able to claim any rights under
rule 806."9 The first two sentences of 806 state a rule permitting a party
to impeach a hearsay declarant. This rule follows similar provisions in
the California Evidence Code, the Uniform Rules, and the Model Code."0 '
In each of the earlier evidence codes this provision is broad enough to per-
mit an employer to impeach an employee or an alleged conspirator to
impeach a co-conspirator when their out-of-court statements are admitted
against the employer or alleged conspirator. The change in the defini-
tion of hearsay has the effect of denying this right to employers and al-
0 5 M cCoRmncK § 267 at 641.
00ld.
9T Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 801 (d)(2), 36 F.R.D. 183
298 (1972).
99E. MORGAN, supra note 25, at 265-66.
90 56 F.R.D. 183, 329 (1972).
1°0 MODEL CODE nile 531, UNiFORM RULE 65, and CAL. EVID. CODE § 1207.
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leged conspirators. 101 There is no justification for this denial and it
should be corrected. 102
SUBDIVISION (d) (1)
This is the most complex subdivision of proposed rule 801 because it
is a combination of four theories. The first of these theories is that an
out-of-court statement is not hearsay if the out-of-court declarant is pres-
ent in the court and available for cross-examination. This is based upon
an argument that the major defect of an out-of-court statement is the
lack of opportunity for cross-examination and that this defect has been
cured by the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant during the trial
itself. 03
The second theory applies only to subdivisions 801(d) (1) (A) and
801(d) (1) (B). This is the well-established rule that out-of-court state-
ments that are inconsistent with the testimony of a witness may be used
to attack the creditability of that witness by showing that he or she made
inconsistent statements and that out-of-court statements that are consis-
tent with the testimony may be used to defend against an attack on the
creditability of that witness by showing that the witness did not recently
fabricate the testimony he or she has given at the trial. There is no vio-
lation of the hearsay rule when out-of-court statements are introduced for
these limited purposes because those statements are merely being intro-
duced to prove that they were made. This is a circumstance that tends
1011973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 204 (Letter from Professor Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.).
102 A party against whom nonassertive conduct or an implied assertion has been admitted
will also be denied any right to use this section with respect to the out-of-court actor or declarant
because those categories of evidence are also defined as "not hearsay." This discrimination
was also present in the Model Code, the Uniform Rules, and the California Evidence Code since
they also defined nonassertive conduct and implied assertions as not hearsay but there does not
appear to be any justification for discrimination along these lines. It would not be necessary
to redefine hearsay in order to solve this problem. The first two sentences of rule 806 could
be rewritten to provide rights to impeach hearsay declarants, agents, employees, and co-conspira.
tors when they are the source of an admission, and any person whose nonassertive conduct or
implied assertions are received in evidence.
1 03 See authorities cited note 23 supra; McCormick, The Turncoat Witness, Previous
Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEX. L REV. 588 (1947); Falknor, Heara, supra
note 26, at 597-98; United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1971); Gel-
harr v. State, 41 Wis.2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969). Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970). In Green the United States Supreme Court held that § 1235 of the California
Evidence Code was hot unconstitutional under the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment. The Court argued that a party against whom a prior inconsistent out-of-court state-
ment of a witness was offered in evidence could conduct a full and effective cross-examination
of that witness at the time of trial. Id. at 159-61. "The most successful cross-examination at
the time the prior statement was made could hardly hope to accomplish more than has already
been accomplished by the fact that the witness is now telling a different, inconsistent story,
and-in this case-one that is favorable to the defendant." Id. at 159. The question the
court was deciding, however, was the constitutional adequacy of this procedure and not its
wisdom as evidence policy. Id. at 155.
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to attack or support the creditability of the witness." 4 Of course, the
evidence that proves to the judge or jury the fact that the out-of-court
statements were made also tells them what the out-of-court statements
said. Judges do instruct juries that the inconsistent and consistent prior
statements are not to be considered as proof of their contents but only of
the fact that they were made. But such instructions are difficult for the
jury to follow and easy for them to disregard.05
The third and fourth theories mixed into subdivision 801 (d) (1) are
theories about the trustworthiness of out-of-court prior statements and
eyewitness identifications. ,These theories differ greatly from the theories
of guarantees of trustworthiness that underlie the exceptions to the hear-
say rule set forth in proposed rules 803 and 804.10
Eyewitness identifications are weak evidence,10' and there is nothing
about out-of-court statements in general that would give circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness. Indeed, if the out-of-court statements are
ones that were obtained by employees of one of the parties in one-party
interviews, the circumstances would appear to guarantee less than normal
trustworthiness. 08
The argument advanced in favor of admitting these kinds of out-of-
court statements is not, however, absolute trustworthiness but relative
trustworthiness. The argument is that these statements are more reliable
than the corresponding in-court statements by the same declarants. Thus
the argument with respect to the prior out-of-court identifications made
admissible by 801(d) (1) (C) is that out-of-court identifications by eye.
witnesses are so much more valuable and convincing than in-court identi-
fications that testimony that out-of-court identifications were made should
somehow be made admissible.100
The Advisory Committee also argued that a similar comparative trust-
worthiness could be found in prior inconsistent statements. The Ad-
visory Committee quoted in its note to 801(d) (1) (A) from the Com-
ment of the California Law Revision Commission to Section 1235 of the
California Evidence Code:
104 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).'
105 Id. at 690, 1007.
100 See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422 (3d ed. 1940); Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence 803 and 804, 56 F.R.D. 183, 300-03 and 320-22 (1972).
107 p. WALL, EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); D. LOUISELL,
J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1203-38 (2d ed. 1972); 4
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1130 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
108 See note 126 infra and accompanying text.
10 0 See text accompanying note 138 infra and Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed
Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C), 56 F.R.D. 183, 296-97 (1972).
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In many cases, the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true
than the testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer
in time to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influ-
enced by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation."10
The admission under 801(d) (1) (B) of prior consistent statements
"offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fab-
rication or improper influence or motive" might also be defended on
similar grounds, but the Advisory Committee did not in fact make such
an argument. Instead, they contented themselves with describing the ef-
fect of 801(d) (1) (B) 111 and then stating:
The prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the
stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admis-
sion in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be re-
ceived generally."12
Although the first theory, that an out-of-court statement is not hear-
say if the out-of-court declarant is present in the court and available for
cross-examination, has received extremely strong scholarly support,1 3 it
has also encountered extremely great opposition.'" This theory appears
in both the Model Code" 5 and the Uniform Rules" 6 as an exception ap-
plicable to all out-of-court statements whose declarant was present in
court to be cross-examined. It was adopted in the California Evidence
Code, however, only for three categories of out-of-court statements.17
The draftsmen of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence followed the
California Evidence Code and proposed three similar categories,113 but
that proposal has been substantially reduced in the legislation adopted by
the House.
This is the only part of proposed rule 801 which the House of Repre-
sentatives changed. The version of this provision promulgated by the
Supreme Court read:
11O Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 56 F.R.
D. 183, 296 (1972).
"ll Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), 56 F.R.D.
183,296 (1972).
112 Id.
"s 3A J. WIGMORE, EViDENcE § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Maguire, supra note 23;
Falknor, Hearsay/supra note 26, at 597-98; McCormick, The Turncoat IVitness, jupra note
103.
114 Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); State v. Mlynczak, 268 Minn.
417, 130 N.W.2d 53 (1964); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939); 1973
Hearings, supra note 7, at 237, 244, 252, 264, 298, and Supplement at 82, 92, 204, 211, 218,
227, 241, 243, and 305.
115 MODEL CODE rule 503 (b).
116 UNFORm RULE 63 (1).
117 CAL EVD. CODE §§ 1235, 1236, 1237.
118 Proposed Rule 801(d) (1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1972).
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, or (B) con-
sistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or mo.
tive, or (C) one of identification of a persoa made after perceiving
him;" 9
The rule in that form would have had two effects: (1) it would have
removed all doubt as to whether the hearsay rule barred proof of out-of-
court identifications and (2) it would have permitted any prior statements
that could qualify for admission for the special limited purpose of im-
peaching or bolstering the credibility of the witness who had made it
also to be considered as substantive evidence.
The Committee Print added a provision that would limit the effect of
what was probably the most important section, 801(d) (1) (A), by pro-
viding that in order to be admissible as proof of the facts stated, the prior
inconsistent statement must have been "given under oath and subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition or before
a grand jury.' '112 0  The bill reported to the House and adopted by it went
even further to restrict prior inconsistent statements and provided that
they must have been "given under oath subject to cross-examination, and
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposi-
tion." 21
The practical effect of 801(d) (1) (A) in the form promulgated by
the Supreme Court -'2 was to permit general use of prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence. The practical effect of the restrictions on
that subdivision adopted by the House 123 is drastically to reduce the num-
ber of cases in -which prior inconsistent statements may be so used. The
issue of whether such a restriction on the substantive use of prior incon-
sistent statements was wise depends upon a judgment of the relative
reliability of prior inconsistent statements and of the testimony with
which they are inconsistent. This evaluation of the relative worth' of
inconsistent statements is very likely to break down into an argument us-
ing the two conflicting characterizations which can be applied to any
hearsay statement depending upon whether one chooses to regard it as
119 d.
120 Proposed Changes, supra note 13, at 26; 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, Supplement at
170.
121 120 CONG. REc. H559 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
1 22 Supra note 118.
123 Supra note 121.
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being as strong as it might be or as infirm as it might be.' 2 Thus per-
sons who believe that witnesses in criminal cases sometimes contradict
the stories set out in the prosecutor's file when they testify on the stand
because the witnesses either have been intimidated by the defendant' 5
or have made their peace with the defendant will be convinced that the
out-of-court statements are true. People who are concerned about the
procedures by which out-of-court statements are obtained will see them
as very doubtful evidence. 26
The advocates of the admission of inconsistent out-of-court statements
as substantive evidence recognize that there is an issue with respect to the
adequacy of subsequent cross-examination, 12 7 but they tend to assume
away by their characterization of the statements the questions of whether
the out-of-court statements were in fact made and whether the witnesses
intended to say what the statements say.'2  It appears to this writer,
12 4 See text following note 77 supra.
125 H. R. Rep. No. 650, supra note 11, at 13.
126 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 244, Supplement at 92 and 218. Frederick B. Mc-
Donald spelled out the dangers of statement-taking in the following language in a letter re-
produced in 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, Supplement 92-94:
The proposed rule will place enormous power in the hands of investigators.
When an investigator takes a signed statement from a witness, he will have admissible
substantive evidence of the matter in the statement even thouh the witness later tells
a different story under oath in the courtroom. This gives investigators greatly in-
creased control over the course of litigation, and such power will be subject to abuse
that will be virtually impossible to control because:
(a) An investigator normally represents only one side of a controversy, and
akes statements with no one present from the other side. Under such circumstances,
an investigator's bias often causes him to overlook and fail to uncover facts favorable
to the other side.
(b) Whether through ordinary bias or affirmative unscrupulousness, an investi-
gator can establish his employer's case or greatly minimize matters unfavorable by
careful phrasing, judicious inclusion and exdusion of facts, and choice of words.
With a little practice, he can produce a most innocent appearing, but very slanted
statement.
(c) The entire responsibility for fairness in statement taking is almost com-
pletely in the hands of the investigator. It is too much to expect that an investigator,
who will be well aware of the vastly increased importance of his work, will observe
the proprieties of a fair investigation, particularly when his future promotion may de-
pend on the effectiveness of his work for his employer.
(d) The proposed rule will place excessive power in the hands of governmental
agencies and other organizations whose work includes court use. The rule will tip
the scales of justice much more toward agencies, organizations and those few indi-
viduals who can afford investigators and away from the less affluent.
Id. at 93.
127 See, e.g., Maguire, supra note 23; McCormick, The Turncoat Witness, supra note 103,
at 576-77; Gelharr v. State, 41 Wis. 2d at 234, 163 N.W.2d at 611. Cf. Califortidta. Green,
399 U.S. at 159.
128 Maguire, supra note 23; Gelharr v. State, 41 Wis. 2d at 234. 163 N.W.2d at 611.
Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158-59. But see McCormick, The Turncoat Vitness,
supra note 103, at 586, text accompanying n.32; J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, CoMMoON SENSE
AND COMMON LAw 59-63 (1947); State v. Mflynczak, 268 Minn. at 420, 130 N.W.2d
1974]
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however, that the question of whether the witness intended to make a
statement saying what the alleged prior inconsistent statement does say
is the most important question with respect to the class of hearsay elimi-
nated by the House amendment to 801(d) (1) (A). This problem can
also be stated in the terms of our earlier analysis of hearsay, in the form
of'the question of whether or not the'hearsay rule is intended to insure
a party not only the right to conduct cross-examination, but the right to
require that the ,evidence introduced against him be introduced through
direct exarnination.
A rule permitting any use of prior inconsistent statements will be used
by those who possess such statements. These will usually be organiitions
such as police departments, prosecutors, insurance companies, and large
bbsiness'es that employ investigators to obtain statements from witnesses.
These statements will normally be in writing but will be composed by the
investigator who obtains the statenient because the investigator WiJl have
a much better understanding of what is relevant than will the witness.
.The writing will be signed by the witness and the signature will indi
cate some kind of acquiescence by the witness, but that acquiescence may
be based upon fear, indifference, or ignorance of what the statement says.
The procedure is the direct opposite of that which can be required on di.
rect examination in a courtroom.
These are not defects that can be used to destroy the effect of the
out-of-court statements on" subsequent' cross-examination at the trial.
Cross-examination cannot destroy the fact that the witness did acquiesce,
and it is unlikely that cross-examination can even weaken the effect of
: that fact 'unless the witness has a perception of what he was doing when
he signed the statement that is inconsistent with the fact that he signed
the statement.
Only if we can convince ourselves that such statements are very likely
to be trustworthy despite the circumstances under which they are taken
can we justify their admission. The case for the admission of similar oral
prior inconsistent statements, with respect to which there must frequently
at 55; State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. at 362, 285 N.W. at 901. The opinion in Allytczak
quotes the following statement from Saporen:
There are additional practical reasons for not attaching anything of substantive
evidential value to extrajudicial assertions which come in only as impeachment. Their
unrestricted use as evidence would increase both temptation and opportunity for the
manufacture of evidence. Declarations extracted by the most extreme of "third de-
gree" methods could readily be made into affirmative evidence. In criminal cases
the defendant would have a similar opportunity to entrap the state's witnesses, and
use as evidence all their extrajudicial assertions. The same enlargement of the field
of inquiry would result in civil cases.
Id. Cf. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. at 124-28, 150 N.W.2d at 156-58.
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)e a substantial issue of whether the witness even acquiesced in the state-
nent, is even weaker.
The version of 801(d) (1) passed by the House eliminated the sub-
tantive use of prior inconsistent statements unless they had been "given
inder oath subject to cross-examination, and subject to the penalty of
)erjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition," but there are two conse-
tuences of this version of 801 (d) (1) that should be pointed out.
First, although the language clearly requires that the witness have
,iven his inconsistent testimony at a trial or a hearing, there is no require-
nent that the trial or hearing was one involving the parties in the case
n which the statement is introduced. The trial or hearing may even
iave been one in which the witness was being prosecuted. Therefore,
here is no assurance that the prior cross-examination was carried out by
L party "with motive and interest similar to those of the party against
vhom" the prior inconsistent statement is introduced.129
Secondly, 801 (d)(1) (A) still remains a rule that will permit a con-
riction or a judgment to be based on an inconsistent statement in the
Lbsence of any other evidence to support the conviction or judgment.
. 1973 decision of the Supreme Court of North Dakota, State it. Igoe,30
,eld that the grand jury testimony of a witness which was denied at the
rial by the witness and which was the only evidence on the charge in
luestion would be enough to uphold a conviction. The court did not up-
iold the conviction because the trial judge had instructed in accordance
vith prior law that the grand jury testimony was not substantive evi-
lence. But the court did indicate that at the next trial of that defendant
he grand jury testimony alone would be enough to uphold a conviction.
.t would appear that the inevitable consequence of a decision to use in-
:onsistent statements as substantive evidence will be that in some cases
:onvictibns and judgments will be based upon inconsistent statements
Llone.1
3 1
129 Under proposed rule 804(b)(1), former testimony of a witness who is unavailable with.
a the meaning of proposed rule 804(a) could not be introduced unless there had been an
)pportunity for direct, cross- or redirect examination by such a party. 56 F.R.D. 183, 320-21
1972).
130 206 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1973).
131 Professor Edward W. Cleary, who served as Reporter to the Advisory Committee, sug-
:ests that the requirement that evidence be sufficient to support a judgment will at least save
s from judgments based upon no more than an unsworn prior inconsistent statement because
he trial judge would direct a verdict (Professor Cleary was writing with respect to the earlier
ersion of 801(d)(1)(A) which would permit such statements to come in as substantive evi-
ence). 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, Supplement at 98-99. It is not apparent, however, why
he prior inconsistent statement would be insufficient once we treat it as substantive evidence.
f the facts stated in the statement would be sufficient if presented through an in-court witness
7ith personal knowledge of-them, will they not also be sufficient if presented through a prior
aconsistent statement?
L974]
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It does not appear that any practical consequences would flow from
the adoption of 801(d) (1) (B). The prior consistent statements which
it would make admissible as substantive evidence merely restate testi-
mony given in court.132  Section 1236 of the California Evidence Code,18
upon which 801(d) (1) (B) is based, has not had any practical effect in
any of the cases in which it has been cited. Even in the one case in
which § 1236 was found to be unconstitutional,3 4 the error in admitting
prior consistent out-of-court statements as substantive evidence was found
to be harmless since the same testimony was given by the in-court wit-
ness.
18 5
It therefore would seem reasonable to describe 801 (d) (1) (B) as a
logical counterpart to 801(d) (1) (A) which is neither greatly to be de-
sired nor feared for its own sake. The House of Representatives demon-
strated its lack of fear of 801(d) (1) (B) by not applying to it the limi-
tations which it placed on 801(d) (1) (A). Therefore, if the House bill
becomes law there will be cases in which the proper instructions to the
jury will be that they may consider the prior consistent statements as sub-
stantive evidence but not the inconsistent statements.
The argument for adoption of 801(d) (1) (C) is much stronger than
the arguments for adoption of parts (A) and (B) of 801(d) (1). Out-
of-court eyewitness identifications are, in fact, more valuable and con-
vincing than in-court identifications. This is a result not of the strength
of out-of-court identifications, for they are dangerous evidence,1 8 but of
the extreme weakness of in-court identifications. Judge Weinstein stated
in United States v. Barbati:3 7
We should not blind ourselves to what the law has learned by bitter
experience-identification in court is frequently an almost worthless for-
mality. See, e.g., authorities collected in United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 228-229, nn. 6-7, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967),
particularly P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases, 26-27
(1965). By the time of trial positions have often become so fixed and
memory so attenuated and distorted by subsequent events that witnesses
seldom make identifications on the basis of their raw recollection of the
132 It is possible to hypothesize a case in which a vital fact is inadvertently not brought out
'during the testimony of a witness but is introduced into evidence as part of a prior consistent
statement that is introduced to counter a "charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive." But 801(d)(1)(B) will have no practical effect except on that hypothetical situation,
133 § 1236 provides: "Prior consistent statement. Evidence of a statement previously made
by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is consistent with his
testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 791."
134 People v. Washington, 71 Cal.2d 1061, 458 P.2d 479, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969).
135 Id. at 1077-78, 458 P.2d at 488,80 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
I3 0 See note 107 supra.
137 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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original event. Their apparent certitude is often misleading and not in-
frequently less reliable than earlier reactions.38
.any American courts have already adopted an enormous variety of
les permitting out-of-court identifications by eyewitnesses to be prov-
L13 9
Rule 801(d) (1) (C) would, however, permit either the person who
td made the identification or any other person who had witnessed the
entification to testify that the identification was made. This would
ean that the identification could be proven by other witnesses even if
e identifying witness could not remember the identification or denied
aking it. Such denied or forgotten identifications could be proven
ren if they were made in circumstances that would not permit them to
alify for substantive use under 801(d) (1) (A) for none of the re-
rictions which the House imposed upon 801(d) (1) (A) apply to 801
:1) () (C)-
Of greater importance, however, is the fact that in the typical case
L which the eyewitness is ready to testify to the out-of-court identification
s story would be bolstered by, and perhaps even preceded by, state-
Lents that the out-of-court identification was made by witnesses who
innot meaningfully be cross-examined about the identification because
iey do not claim to have any knowledge of the basis on which the eye-
itness was made. Given the weak nature of eyewitness identification"
e should not permit assertions that an out-of-court identification was
tade to come into court in a form in which it is immune to cross-exami-
ation. Only the witness who claims to have made an out-of-court iden-
fication should be permitted to testify in court about the identifica-
on.141
CONCLUSION
Professor Callahan's close analysis of legal problems frequently re-
ioved some unnecessary complications from our classroom discussions,
ut he was not trying to make legal analysis simple, he was trying to make
138Id. at 413.
13 9 See cases collected in 71 A.I.R.2d 449 (1960) and 5 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 1225-
3 (1967) and Supplement 215-34 (1973).
140 See note 107 supra.
141 See Seals v. State, 282 Ala. 586, 602-03, 213 So. 2d 645, 661-62 (1968). Even under
ich a rule, testimony by other witnesses that the identification was made would still be pos-
ble under the rules permitting proof of prior consistent statements for the limited purpose
F rebutting "'testimony tending to impeach or discredit the identifying witness, or to rebut a
aarge, imputation or inference of falsity." Id. at 603, 213 So. 2d at 661. This ought to be
ermitted only, however, when the fact that the identification was made does tend to rebut some
iarge rather than merely to repeat the identification.
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it more realistic. This goal was expressed in the following description
of the statute of limitations in a 1955 article:
Further, such evidence as there is suggests that the statute, even as ap-
plied to a single question, reflects a fairly complex mixture of purposes,
some of which overlap, and some of which may be partly inconsistent
with others. It is likely that if this multiplicity of purposes is recog-
nized the "philosophical mind" still will be vexed; but it may see what
is vexing it.142
This article has attempted to clarify the vexing problems created by
the elaborate redefinition of hearsay in proposed Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801. The most vexing of these problems is that under proposed
rule 801 four kinds of evidence which appear to present the usual hear-
say dangers-nonassertive acts, implied assertions, prior inconsistent out-
of-court statements, and statements by third persons that out-of-court
identifications were made-are classified as "not hearsay" and are there-
fore admissible in evidence. Whether courts should forbid the use of
ordinary hearsay as evidence is itself open to question, 1 8 but if we do
forbid the use of ordinary hearsay we cannot justify the admission of
these four kinds of evidence merely by defining them as "not hearsay."
142 Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIo ST. L.J. 130, 132-33 (1935).
143 See, e.g., Maguire, supra note 23, at 741. But see, A. LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMP/aT
238 (1964), for proof that experienced judges may not be in a position to judge to what ex.
tent apparently valuable evidence would be damaged by a cross-examination that did not oc-
cur.
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